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9.22 Controlled Substance—Attempted Distribution to Person Under 21 Years

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9.22 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE—ATTEMPTED 
DISTRIBUTION TO PERSON UNDER 21 YEARS
(21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 and 859)

The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with attempted distribution of [specify controlled substance] to a person under the age of twenty-one years in violation of Sections 841(a)(1), 846 and 859 of Title 21 of the United States Code. In order for the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, the defendant intended to distribute [specify controlled substance] to [name of underage person];

Second, the defendant knew that it was [specify controlled substance] or some other federally controlled substance;

Third, the defendant was at least eighteen years of age;

Fourth, [name of underage person] was under the age of twenty-one years; and

Fifth, the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime and that strongly corroborated the defendant’s intent to commit the crime.

Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of distribution of [specify controlled substance] to a person under the age of twenty-one years. To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s act or actions must unequivocally demonstrate that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.

Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.

"Distribution" means delivery or transfer of possession of [specify controlled substance] to another person, with or without any financial interest in that transaction.

Comment

See Comment to Instructions 9.15 (Controlled Substance–Possession with Intent to Distribute), 9.16 (Determining Amount of Controlled Substance) and 9.21 (Controlled Substance–Distribution to Person Under 21 Years).

Regarding cases involving a "controlled substance analogue" as it is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A), the Supreme Court held in McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015), that, in order to prove the knowledge element, the government must prove that either the defendant knew that the substance distributed is treated as a drug listed on the federal drug schedules—regardless of whether he knew the particular identity of the substance—or "that the defendant knew the specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an analogue." Id. at 2305.

"To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s actions must cross the line between preparation and attempt by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances." United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).

The "strongly corroborated" language in this instruction is taken from United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1980) ("A conviction for attempt requires proof of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime that strongly corroborates that intent.") and United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).

Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime. United States v. Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).

"[A] person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even though that person may have actually completed the crime." United States v. Rivera-Relle, 333 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2003).  

Approved 4/2019