**12.13 Controlled Substance—Attempted Employment of Minor to**

**Violate Drug Laws (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 861(a)(1))**

 The defendant is charged in [Count \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ of] the indictment with attempted employment of a minor to [*specify drug law violation*] in violation of Sections 841(a)(1), 846 and 861(a)(1) of Title 21 of the United States Code. For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

 First, the defendant intended to [[hire] [use] [persuade] [coerce] [induce] [entice] [employ]] [*name of minor*] to [*specify drug law violation and controlled substance*];

 Second, the defendant was at least eighteen years of age;

 Third, [*name of minor*] was under the age of eighteen years; and

 Fourth, the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime.

 A “substantial step” is conduct that strongly corroborated the defendant’s intent to commit the crime. To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s act or actions must unequivocally demonstrate that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances. Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of [hiring] [using] a minor to violate the drug laws.

 Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.

**Comment**

 *See* Comment to Instruction 12.12 (Controlled Substance—Employment of Minor to Violate Drug Law).

 Regarding cases involving a “controlled substance analogue” as it is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A), the Supreme Court held in *McFadden v. United States*, 576 U.S. 186 (2015), that, to prove the knowledge element, the government must prove that either the defendant knew that the substance distributed is treated as a drug listed on the federal drug schedules—regardless of whether he knew the particular identity of the substance—or “that the defendant knew the specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an analogue.” *Id*. at 194-95. With respect to the definition of “controlled substance analogue” as meaning “a substance . . . (i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II,” 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)(i), substances are “substantially similar” for purposes of the statute if he two chemicals “share a common core of identical chemical structural features and that the subset of differences between the two chemicals does not make a difference in the substance’s ‘relevant characteristics’” *United States v. Galecki*, 89F.4th 713, 731 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting *United States v. Roberts*, 363 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2004)).

 “To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s ‘actions must cross the line between preparation and attempt by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances’.” *United States v. Goetzke*, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting *United States v. Nelson*, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)).

 The “strongly corroborated” language in this instruction comes from *United States v. Snell*, 627 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“A conviction for attempt requires proof of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime that strongly corroborates that intent.”) and *United States v. Darby*, 857 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).

 Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime. *United States v. Hofus*, 598 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).

 “[A] person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even though that person may have actually completed the crime.” *United States v. Rivera-Relle*, 333 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2003).

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