The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with counterfeiting in violation of Section 471 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [[falsely made] [forged] [counterfeited] [altered]] [specify obligation or security of United States]; and 

            Second, the defendant acted with intent to defraud. 

            To be counterfeit, [specify item] must have a likeness or resemblance to the genuine [specify obligation or security of United States]. 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud). 

            See United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1970), regarding the requirement for likeness or resemblance to the genuine obligation or security. 

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [[passing] [uttering] [publishing] [selling]] [[attempting to [pass] [utter] [publish] [sell]] a counterfeit obligation in violation of Section 472 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [[passed] [uttered] [published] [sold]] [[attempted to [pass] [utter] [publish] [sell]] a [[falsely made] [forged] [counterfeit] [altered]] [specify obligation or security of United States]; 

            Second, the defendant knew that the [specify obligation or security of United States] was [falsely made] [forged] [counterfeited] [altered]; [and] 

            Third, the defendant acted with the intent to defraud[.] [; and] 

            [Fourth, the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime. 

           A “substantial step” is conduct that strongly corroborated the defendant’s intent to commit the crime.  To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s act or actions must unequivocally demonstrate that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.  Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward committing the crime.

            Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.] 

            To be counterfeit, a bill must have a likeness or resemblance to the genuine [specify obligation or security of United States]. 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud). 

            An utterance has been described as tantamount to an offer.  United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). 

            The bracketed language stating an additional element applies only when the charge is an attempt.  In attempt cases, “To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s ‘actions must cross the line between preparation and attempt by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances’.”  United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

            The “strongly corroborated” language in this instruction comes from United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“A conviction for attempt requires proof of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime that strongly corroborates that intent.”) and United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 

            Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.  United States v. Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010). 

            “[A] person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even though that person may have actually completed the crime.”  United States v. Rivera-Relle, 333 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Revised May 2023

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with connecting parts of two or more [specify genuine instrument] in violation of Section 484 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant connected together parts of two or more [specify genuine instrument] issued under the authority of [specify issuer]; and 

            Second, the defendant did so with the intent to defraud. 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud).

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with falsely making, altering, forging, or counterfeiting [specify writing] in violation of Section 495 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [falsely made] [altered] [forged] [counterfeited] [specify writing]; and 

            Second, the defendant did so for the purpose [of obtaining or receiving] [enabling another person to obtain or receive] money from [the United States] [an officer of the United States] [an agent of the United States].

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [uttering] [publishing] as true a false writing with the intent to defraud the United States in violation of Section 495 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [uttered] [published] as true a [falsely made] [altered] [forged] [counterfeit] [specify writing]; 

            Second, the defendant knew that the [specify writing] was [falsely made] [altered] [forged] [counterfeited]; and 

            Third, the defendant acted with the intent to defraud the United States. 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud). 

            An utterance has been described as tantamount to an offer.  United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000).

           The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [transmitting] [presenting] a false writing in support of or in relation to an account or claim with intent to defraud the United States.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [transmitted] [presented] a [[falsely made] [altered] [forged] [counterfeit]] [specify writing] to an [office] [officer] of the United States; 

            Second, the defendant knew that the [specify writing] was [falsely made] [altered] [forged] [counterfeit]; 

            Third, the [specify writing] was [transmitted] [presented] in support of [specify account or claim]; 

            Fourth, the defendant acted with intent to defraud the United States; and 

            Fifth, the [specify writing] was material to action on the [specify account or claim]; that is, the [specify writing] had a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, action on the [specify account or claim]. 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud). 

            In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1999), the Court explained that materiality is a necessary aspect of the legal concept of fraud which is incorporated into criminal statutes concerning fraud unless the statute says otherwise (holding materiality of falsehood must be proved in prosecution under bank, mail, and wire fraud statutes).  The common law test for materiality in the false statement statutes, as reflected in the fifth element of this instruction, is the preferred formulation.  United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008). 

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with forging or falsely making [an endorsement] [a signature] on a Treasury [check] [bond] [security] of the United States in violation of Section 510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant falsely made or forged [an endorsement] [a signature] on a Treasury [check] [bond] [security] of the United States; and 

            Second, the defendant did so with intent to defraud. 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud—Defined).

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [[passing] [uttering] [publishing] [attempting to [pass] [utter] [publish]] a Treasury [check] [bond] [security] of the United States in violation of Section 510 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [[passed] [uttered] [published]] [attempted to [pass] [utter] [publish]] a Treasury [check] [bond] [security] of the United States which bore a falsely made or forged [endorsement] [signature]; [and] 

            Second, the defendant did so with intent to defraud[.] [; and] 

            [Third, the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward committing the crime. 

           A “substantial step” is conduct that strongly corroborated the defendant’s intent to commit the crime.  To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s act or actions must unequivocally demonstrate that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.  Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward committing the crime.

            Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.] 

Comment 

            For a definition of “intent to defraud,” see Instruction 4.13 (Intent to Defraud). 

            An utterance has been described as tantamount to an offer.  United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). 

             The bracketed language stating an additional element applies only when the charge is an attempt.  In attempt cases, “To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s ‘actions must cross the line between preparation and attempt by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances’.”  United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)).

             The “strongly corroborated” language in this instruction comes from United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“A conviction for attempt requires proof of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime that strongly corroborates that intent.”) and United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 

            Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.  United States v. Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).

            “[A] person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even though that person may have actually completed the crime.”  United States v. Rivera-Relle, 333 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Revised May 2023