The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with obstruction of justice in violation of Section 1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, [name of juror] was a [prospective] [grand] juror; 

            Second, the defendant tried to influence, intimidate, or impede [name of juror] in the discharge of [his] [her] duties as a [grand] juror; and 

            Third, the defendant acted corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening communication, with the intent to obstruct justice. 

            [The government need not prove that the defendant’s sole or even primary intention was to obstruct justice so long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the defendant’s intentions was to obstruct justice.  The defendant’s intention to obstruct justice must be substantial.] 

Comment 

            See Comment at Instruction 4.12 (Corruptly). 

            If the corrupt act at issue involved the making of a false statement, materiality of the false statement is a required element of the crime.  See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2010). 

            As used in § 1503, “‘corruptly’ . . . means that the act must be done with the purpose of obstructing justice.”  United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981). 

            Include the last paragraph if the evidence shows the defendant may have had more than one intention when engaging in the challenged conduct.  See United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016). 

            Section 1503 also applies to venire members who have not been sworn or selected as jurors and are prospective jurors.  United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921). 

Revised June 2021

           The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with obstruction of justice in violation of Section 1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, [name of juror] was a [grand] juror [who assented to a [verdict] [indictment]]; and 

            Second, the defendant injured [name of juror] [or [his] [her] property] on account of [his] [her] having [been] [assented to the [verdict] [indictment] as] a [grand] juror. 

Comment 

            See Comment to Instruction 19.1 (Obstruction of Justice—Influencing Juror (18 U.S.C. § 1503)).

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with obstruction of justice in violation of Section 1503 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant influenced, obstructed, or impeded, or tried to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice; and 

            Second, the defendant acted corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening communication, with the intent to obstruct justice. 

            [The government need not prove that the defendant’s sole or even primary intention was to obstruct justice so long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the defendant’s intentions was to obstruct justice. The defendant’s intention to obstruct justice must be substantial.] 

Comment 

            See Comment at Instruction 4.12 (Corruptly). 

            If the corrupt act at issue involved the making of a false statement, materiality of the false statement is a required element of the crime.  See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2010). 

            As used in § 1503, “‘corruptly’ . . . means that the act must be done with the purpose of obstructing justice.”  United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981). 

            Include the last paragraph if the evidence shows the defendant may have had more than one intention when engaging in the challenged conduct.  See United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016). 

            “The ‘omnibus clause’ of § 1503 . . . provides: ‘Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be [punished].’”  United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)). 

Revised June 2021

          The defendant is charged in [Count _____ of] the indictment with obstruction of justice in violation of Section 1519 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant knowingly altered, destroyed, concealed, or falsified a record, document, or tangible object; and 

            Second, the defendant acted with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence an actual or contemplated investigation of a matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.  

            [The government need not prove that the defendant’s sole or even primary intention was to obstruct justice so long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the defendant’s intentions was to obstruct justice.  The defendant’s intention to obstruct justice must be substantial.] 

Comment 

            For a definition of “knowingly,” see Instructions 4.8 (Knowingly) and 4.9 (Deliberate Ignorance). 

            Include the last paragraph if the evidence shows the defendant may have had more than one intention when engaging in the challenged conduct.  See United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016). 

            Reports prepared by law enforcement officers qualify as “records” or “documents” under § 1519.  United States v. Gonzalez, 906 F.3d 784, 794 (9th Cir. 2018). 

            To qualify as a “tangible object” under the meaning of § 1519, an item must be “one used to record or preserve information.”  Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 549 (2015) (holding fisherman’s undersized fish were not “tangible objects” under § 1519). 

            Even when a defendant intends to obstruct justice, the government still must prove that the defendant actually altered, destroyed, concealed, or falsified a record, document, or other tangible object used to record or preserve information, to secure a conviction under § 1519.  United States v. Katakis, 800 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming judgment of acquittal because government failed to prove that defendant who meant to delete emails successfully did so and holding that moving emails into “deleted items” folder did not qualify as concealment under § 1519). 

            To sustain a conviction under § 1519, it is enough for the government to prove that the defendant intended to obstruct the investigation of any matter if that matter falls within the jurisdiction of a federal department or agency.  The defendant need not know that the matter in question falls within the jurisdiction of a federal department or agency.  Gonzalez, 906 F.3d at 794-96. 

Revised June 2021

Comment

 Section 1512(c)(2) prohibits impairing “the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in (c)(1)” and “the availability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond the ‘record[s], document[s], or other object[s]’ enumerated in (c)(1), such as witness testimony or intangible information,” but does not extend to other obstructive conduct. Fischerv. United States, 603 U.S. __, 144 S. Ct. 2176, 2185-86 (2024).

Section 1512(c)(2) “requires a showing of nexus,” namely that “(1) the obstructive conduct be connected to a specific official proceeding that was (2) either pending or was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant when he engaged in the conduct.”  United State v. Lonich, 23 F.4th 881, 905 (9th Cir. 2022) (alterations omitted) (quoting United State v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 385 (9th Cir. 2019)). 

See Comment to Instruction 4.12 (Corruptly).  Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet defined “corruptly” for purposes of § 1512(c), the court has “affirmed an instruction stating that ‘“corruptly” meant acting with “consciousness of wrongdoing”’ because it, ‘if anything, . . . placed a higher burden of proof on the government than [§] 1512(c) demands.’”  Lonich, 23 F.4th at 906 (quoting United States v. Watters, 717 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2013)).

Revised Sep 2024