Each member of the conspiracy is responsible for the actions of the other conspirators performed during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. If one member of a conspiracy commits a crime in furtherance of a conspiracy, the other members have also, under the law, committed that crime.
Therefore, you may find the defendant guilty of  as charged in Count _______ of the indictment if the government has proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, a person named in Count _______ of the indictment committed the crime of  as alleged in that count;
Second, the person was a member of the conspiracy charged in Count _______ of the indictment;
Third, the person committed the crime of  in furtherance of the conspiracy;
Fourth, the defendant was a member of the same conspiracy at the time the offense charged in Count _______ was committed; and
Fifth, the offense fell within the scope of the unlawful agreement and could reasonably have been foreseen to be a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
The charge derives its name from , 328 U.S. 640 (1946), which held that a defendant could be held liable for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator as long as the offense occurred within the course of the conspiracy, was within the scope of the agreement, and could reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. , 231 F3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); , 984 F.3d 1343, 1355-1356 (9th Cir. 2021).
When this instruction is appropriate, it should be given in addition to Instruction 8.20 (Conspiracy—Elements).
This Instruction is based upon United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d at 1202-03, in which the Ninth Circuit approved of the 1997 version of Instruction 8.5.5 (Conspiracy— Charge), and , 150 F.3d 983, 996-97 (Cir. 1998). , 996 F.3d 784, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2018); , 763 F.3d 1189, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2014).
This instruction was found adequate in which three separate conspiracies were charged. , 493 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2007). However, given the potential for ambiguity where more than one conspiracy is charged, the court should consider giving separate Pinkerton instructions for each conspiracy charged.