The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with theft of government [money] [property] in violation of Section 641 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant knowingly [[embezzled] [stole] [converted to the defendant’s use] [converted to the use of another]] [money] [property of value] with the intention of depriving the owner of the use or benefit of the [money] [property]; 

            Second, the [money] [property] belonged to the United States; and 

            Third, the value of the [money] [property] was more than $1,000. 

Comment 

            This instruction deals with the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 641.  Instruction 23.2 (Receiving Stolen Government Money or Property) deals with the second paragraph of § 641. 

            Theft of money or property having a value of $1,000 or less is a misdemeanor.  18 U.S.C. § 641.  If the crime charged is a misdemeanor, the third element of this instruction should be omitted. 

            Knowledge that stolen property belonged to the United States is not an element of the offense.  Baker v. United States, 429 F.2d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1970). 

            See United States v. Campbell, 42 F.3d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1994) (government must prove defendant stole property with intention of depriving owner of use or benefit of property). 

            To qualify as property of the United States, “the United States ‘must have “title to, possession of, or control over” the funds involved.’”  United States v. Kranovich, 401 F.3d 1107, 113 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1988)).  Property belongs to the United States for the purposes of § 641 even if it is in the possession of a third party or commingled with a third party’s funds so long as the government exercises “supervision and control of the funds and their ultimate use.”  Id. at 1113-14 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Von Stephens, 774 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). 

Revised Sept. 2018

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [[receiving] [concealing] [retaining]] [[embezzled] [stolen] [converted]] government [money] [property] in violation of Section 641 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant knowingly [[received] [concealed] [retained]] [[money] [property of value]]; 

            Second, the [money] [property] belonged to the United States; 

            Third, the defendant knew that the [money] [property] had been [embezzled] [stolen] [converted]; 

            Fourth, the defendant intended to convert the [money] [property] to [his] [her] own use or gain; and 

            Fifth, the value of the [money] [property] was more than $1,000. 

Comment 

            See Comment to Instruction 23.1 (Theft of Government Money or Property). 

Revised July 2011

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [theft] [embezzlement] [misapplication] of bank funds in violation of Section 656 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  

            First, the defendant was a [specify position held] of the [specify financial institution];  

            Second, the defendant knowingly and willfully [stole] [embezzled] [misapplied] funds or credits belonging to the bank or entrusted to its care in excess of $1,000;          

            Third, the defendant acted with the intent to injure or defraud the [specify financial institution];  

            Fourth, the [specify financial institution] was [specify Section 656 status]; and  

            Fifth, the amount of money taken was more than $1,000.  

            The fact that the defendant may have intended to repay the funds at the time they were taken is not a defense.

Comment  

            Although not found in the statute, “intent to injure or defraud” has been held to be an essential element of the crime.  United States v. Stozek,783 F.2d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 1986).  “Intent to defraud may be inferred from a defendant’s reckless disregard of the bank’s interests.”  United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Stozek, 783 F.2d at 893).  

            If the crime charged is a misdemeanor, the fifth element of this instruction should be omitted.  

If Instruction 4.8 (Knowingly) is modified and “limit[ed] only to ‘acts’ committed knowingly,” such an instruction will not “undermine[] the specific mens rea requirements applicable to misapplication of bank funds” offenses.  United States v. Lonich, 23 F.4th 881, 901 (9th Cir. 2022).  

Revised Mar. 2022

Comment 

            The Committee recommends that when the defendant is charged with embezzlement or willful misapplication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 657, Instruction 23.3 (Theft, Embezzlement, or Misapplication of Bank Funds) should be used with appropriate modifications.  Section 656 and Section 657 contain the same elements.  United States v. Musacchio, 968 F.2d 782, 787 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991). 

            See United States v. Bennett, 621 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010) (interpreting “financial institution” under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 to exclude wholly owned subsidiary of financial institution and criticizing United States v. Cartwright, 632 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1980), which held that “a subsidiary’s assets ‘belonged to’ a parent corporation for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 657”).

Revised Sept. 2018

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with theft from [an interstate] [a foreign] shipment in violation of Section 659 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant stole the property described in the indictment from a shipment in [interstate] [foreign] commerce; [and] 

            Second, the defendant did so with the intent to convert the property to [his] [her] own use[.] [; and] 

            [Third, the property had a value of $1,000 or more.] 

            Property is moving as or is [a part of] a shipment in [interstate] [foreign] commerce if the point of origin is in one [state] [country] and the destination is another [state] [country].  Property is moving as [an interstate] [a foreign] shipment at all points between the point of origin and the final destination, regardless of any temporary stop while awaiting transshipment or otherwise.

Comment 

            This instruction deals with theft from a shipment in interstate or foreign commerce subject to the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 659.  If the charge under the first paragraph of § 659 is based on conduct other than theft, modify the instruction accordingly. 

            Use the third element only if the charge alleges that the value of the property was $1,000 or more, use the third element.

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with transportation of a stolen [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] in [interstate] [foreign] commerce in violation of Section 2312 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] was stolen; 

            Second, the defendant transported the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] between [one state and another] [a foreign nation and the United States]; 

            Third, the defendant knew the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] had been stolen at the time the defendant transported it; and 

            Fourth, the defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of ownership of the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft]. 

            [It is not necessary that the taking of the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] be unlawful at the time of the taking.  Even if possession is lawfully acquired, the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] will be deemed “stolen” if the defendant thereafter forms the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership and keeps the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] for the defendant's own use.] 

Comment 

            The elements stated in this instruction were identified by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Albuquerque, 538 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1976), and Jones v. United States, 378 F.2d 340, 341 (9th Cir. 1967). 

            The terms “motor vehicle,” “vessel,” and “aircraft” are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2311. 

            Where a person lawfully obtains possession of a motor vehicle and later forms an intention to convert it to that person’s own use, and in furtherance of that intention transports it across state boundaries, a violation of the statute has occurred.  United States v. Miles, 472 F.2d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 

Revised Apr. 2019

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [receiving] [possessing] [concealing] [storing] [bartering] [selling] [disposing of] a stolen [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] in violation of Section 2313 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] was stolen; 

            Second, after being stolen, the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] was transported in [interstate] [foreign] commerce, meaning between [one state and another] [a foreign nation and the United States]; 

            Third, the defendant [received] [possessed] [concealed] [stored] [bartered] [sold] [disposed of] the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] while it was in [interstate] [foreign] commerce; and 

            Fourth, the defendant knew that the [motor vehicle] [vessel] [aircraft] was stolen at the time [he] [she] acted. 

            The government need not prove the defendant knew the property was in [interstate] [foreign] commerce; it need only prove the defendant knew it was stolen. 

            Something enters [interstate] [foreign] commerce when its transportation begins in one [state] [country] and is intended to continue into another.  Property does not continue to be in [interstate] [foreign] commerce indefinitely.  It ordinarily ceases to be in [interstate] [foreign] commerce when delivered to its final destination, unless it is being held there for some improper purpose, such as disguising its nature as stolen property or preparing it for re-sale as legitimate property. 

Comment 

            An instruction that roughly used the same elements of this instruction was approved in United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 666 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983).  The defendant’s knowledge that the stolen property was “in interstate commerce” is not an element of the offense.  Id.  The four-element format is derived from United States v. Albuquerque, 538 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating elements of transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce). 

            Whether property is in interstate commerce is a fact for the jury to determine under all of the circumstances.  Henderson, 721 F.2d at 666 n.3.  The time a stolen object remains in the destination state may indicate it has left interstate commerce, but other factors may negate this inference. 

Revised Jan. 2019

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with the transportation of stolen property in [interstate] [foreign] commerce in violation of Section 2314 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [transported] [transmitted] [transferred] stolen [specify property] between [one state and another] [a foreign nation and the United States]; 

            Second, at the time that the [specify property] crossed the [state] [country] border, the defendant knew it was stolen; 

            Third, the defendant intended to deprive the owner of the ownership of the [specify property] temporarily or permanently; and 

            Fourth, the money or property was of the value of $5,000 or more. 

            The government need not prove who stole the [specify property]. 

Comment 

            The government need not show by direct evidence that the property was stolen.  United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1328 (9th Cir. 1977). 

            In United States v. Albuquerque, 538 F.2d 277, 278 (9th Cir. 1976), it was held that one of the elements of the offense of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle was that the defendant intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of ownership. 

            Section 2314 creates several distinct crimes.  This instruction only applies to interstate or foreign movement of stolen property. 

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with [receiving] [possessing] [concealing] [storing] [bartering] [selling] [disposing of] stolen [specify stolen property] in violation of Section 2315 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [received] [possessed] [concealed] [stored] [bartered] [sold] [disposed of] [specify stolen property] that had crossed a [state] [United States] boundary after having been stolen; 

            Second, at the time the defendant did so [he] [she] knew that the [specify stolen property] had been stolen; and 

            Third, the [specify stolen property] was of a value of $5,000 or more. 

            The government need not prove the defendant knew the property was in interstate commerce; it need only prove the defendant knew it was stolen. 

            Something enters [interstate] [foreign] commerce when its transportation begins in one [state] [country] and is intended to continue into another.  Property does not continue to be in [interstate] [foreign] commerce indefinitely.  It ordinarily ceases to be in [interstate] [foreign] commerce when delivered to its final destination [, unless it is being held there for some improper purpose such as disguising its nature as stolen property or preparing it for re-sale as legitimate property]. 

Comment 

            See Comment to Instruction 23.7 (Sale or Receipt of Stolen Vehicle, Vessel, or Aircraft). 

            Section 2315 of Title 18 creates a variety of crimes in addition to those addressed in this instruction.  Among them is the crime of pledging or accepting stolen property as security for a loan.  When that is the crime charged, the value of the stolen property need be only $500.  If one of the other crimes is charged, this instruction should be modified.

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with mail theft in violation of Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, there was [[a letter] [a postal card] [a package] [a bag] [mail]] [[in the mail] [in a private mail box] [at a post office] [in a letter box] [in a mail receptacle] [in a mail route] [in an authorized depository for mail matter] [in possession of a letter or mail carrier]]; 

            Second, the defendant tookthe [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail] from the [mail] [post office] [letter box] [private mail box] [mail receptacle] [mail route] [authorized depository for mail matter] [letter or mail carrier]; and 

            Third, at the time the defendant took the [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail], the defendant intended to deprive the owner, temporarily or permanently, of its use and benefit. 

Comment 

            A jury may infer that the defendant stole an item of mail if a properly addressed and recently mailed item was never received by the addressee and was found in the defendant's possession.  See United States v. Ellison, 469 F.2d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 1972). 

Revised June 2021

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with attempted mail theft in violation of Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant intended to steal mail from a [post office] [letter box] [private mailbox] [mail receptacle] [mail route] [authorized depository for mail matter] [mail carrier]; and 

            Second, the defendant did something that was a substantial step toward stealing the mail. 

           A “substantial step” is conduct that strongly corroborated the defendant’s intent to commit the crime.  To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s act or actions must unequivocally demonstrate that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.  Mere preparation is not a substantial step toward committing the crime. 

            Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.  

Comment 

           “To constitute a substantial step, a defendant’s actions must cross the line between preparation and attempt by unequivocally demonstrating that the crime will take place unless interrupted by independent circumstances.”  United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

            The “strongly corroborated” language in this instruction comes from United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“A conviction for attempt requires proof of culpable intent and conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime that strongly corroborates that intent.”), and United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 

            Jurors do not need to agree unanimously as to which particular act or actions constituted a substantial step toward the commission of a crime.  United States v. Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010). 

            “[A] person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime even though that person may have actually completed the crime.”  United States v. Rivera-Relle, 333 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Revised May 2023

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with possession of stolen mail in violation of Section 1708 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, [a letter] [a postal card] [a package] [a bag] [mail] was stolen from the [mail] [post office] [letter box] [private mailbox] [mail receptacle] [mail route] [authorized depository for mail matter] [letter or mail carrier]. 

            Second, the defendant possessed the [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail] [or specify an article or thing contained therein]; and 

            Third, the defendant knew that the [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail] was stolen. 

Comment 

            See Instruction 23.10 (Mail Theft). 

            It is not necessary that the defendant knew the matter was stolen from the mail so long as the defendant knew that it was stolen. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 (1973). 

Revised June 2021

            The defendant is charged in [Count _______ of] the indictment with embezzling mail in violation of Section 1709 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, while working as a Postal Service employee, the defendant [was entrusted with] [came into possession of] the [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail]; 

            Second, the [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail] was intended to be conveyed by mail; and 

            Third, the defendant embezzled the [letter] [postal card] [package] [bag] [mail] [or specify an article or thing contained therein]. 

Comment 

            The government need not prove in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1709 that the defendant had the specific intent permanently to deprive the owner of the property.  United States v. Monday, 614 F.3d 983, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Revised June 2021

            The defendant is charged in [Count_____ of] the indictment with economic espionage in violation of Section 1831 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant [intended] [knew] that his actions would benefit any [foreign government] [foreign instrumentality] [foreign agent]; 

            Second, the defendant knowingly: 

[[stole] [without authorization [appropriated] [took] [carried away] [concealed]] [obtained by fraud] [obtained by artifice] [obtained by deception] a trade secret]; 

or 

[without authorization [copied] [duplicated] [sketched] [drew] [photographed] [downloaded] [uploaded] [altered] [destroyed] [photocopied] [replicated] [transmitted] [delivered] [sent] [mailed] [communicated] [conveyed] a trade secret]; 

or 

[[received] [bought] [possessed] a trade secret, knowing the same to have been [stolen] [appropriated without authorization] [obtained without authorization] [converted without authorization]]. 

Comment 

             Use this instruction “when there is evidence of foreign government sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity” involving “any manner of benefit.”  United States v. Liew, 856 F.3d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998)).

            The term “foreign instrumentality,” as used in these instructions, means any agency, bureau, ministry, component, institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm, or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign government.  18 U.S.C. § 1839(1).  A “foreign agent” is any officer, employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or representative of a foreign government.  18 U.S.C. § 1839(2). 

            If the indictment charges conspiracy to commit economic espionage (18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5)), the jury should be instructed that it is not necessary for the government to prove that the information the alleged conspirators intended to misappropriate was, in fact, a trade secret.  What is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and at least one other member of the conspiracy knowingly agreed to misappropriate information that they reasonably believed was a trade secret and did so for the benefit of a foreign government or foreign instrumentality.  This is because the defendant’s guilt or innocence on this charge depends on what he believed the circumstances to be, not what they actually were.  See Liew, 856 F.3d at 594, 600; United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2016). 

            Similarly, if the indictment charges attempt to commit economic espionage (18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(4)), the jury should be instructed that the government is not required to prove that the information the defendant is alleged to have attempted to misappropriate was, in fact, a trade secret.  However, the government is required to prove the defendant reasonably believed that the information the defendant intended to misappropriate was a trade secret.  Id. 

Revised June 2021

            The defendant is charged in [Count______ of] the indictment with theft of trade secrets in violation of Section 1832 of Title 18 of the United States Code.  For the defendant to be found guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 

            First, the defendant intended to convert a trade secret to the economic benefit of someone other than the owner of that trade secret; 

            Second, the trade secret is related to a [[product] [service]] [[used in] [intended for use in]] [[interstate] [foreign]] commerce; 

            Third, the defendant [intended] [knew] that the offense would injure any owner of that trade secret; 

            Fourth, the defendant knowingly: 

[[stole] [without authorization [appropriated] [took] [carried away] [concealed]] [obtained by fraud] [obtained by artifice] [obtained by deception] such information]; 

or 

[without authorization [copied] [duplicated] [sketched] [drew] [photographed] [downloaded] [uploaded] [altered] [destroyed] [photocopied] [replicated] [transmitted] [delivered] [sent] [mailed] [communicated] [conveyed] such information]; 

or 

[[received] [bought] [possessed] such information, knowing the same to have been [stolen] [appropriated without authorization] [obtained without authorization] [converted without authorization]]. 

Comment 

             Use this instruction in “general criminal trade secrets” cases in which the benefit is “economic,” and not for the benefit of a foreign government or instrumentality.  United States v. Liew, 856 F.3d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998)). 

            If the indictment charges conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(5)), the jury should be instructed that it is not necessary for the government to prove that the information the alleged conspirators intended to convert was, in fact, a trade secret.  What is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and at least one other member of the conspiracy knowingly agreed to convert information that they reasonably believed was a trade secret and did so for the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner.  This is because the defendant’s guilt or innocence on this charge depends on what he believed the circumstances to be, not what they actually were.  See Liew, 856 F.3d at 594, 600; United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2016). 

            Similarly, if the indictment charges attempt to commit theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4)), the jury should be instructed that the government is not required to prove that the information the defendant is alleged to have attempted to convert was, in fact, a trade secret.  However, the government is required to prove the defendant reasonably believed that the information the defendant intended to convert was a trade secret.  Id. 

Revised June 2021

            The term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing, if: 

First, the information is actually secret because it is not generally known to or readily ascertainable through proper means by another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information; 

Second, the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and 

Third, the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from being secret. 

            In addition, facts and information acquired by an employee, whether by memorization or some other means, in the course of his or her employment may potentially be trade secrets, but only if they meet the definition of a trade secret set forth above.  However, the personal skills, talents, or abilities that an employee develops at his place of employment are not trade secrets. 

            The term “trade secret” can include compilations of public information when combined or compiled in a novel way, even if a portion or every individual portion of that compilation is generally known.  Combinations or compilations of public information from a variety of different sources, when combined or compiled in a novel way, can be a trade secret.  In such a case, if a portion of the trade secret is generally known or even if every individual portion of the trade secret is generally known, the compilation or combination of information may still qualify as a trade secret if it meets the definition of a trade secret set forth above. 

Comment 

            The three elements of the definition of “trade secret” were set forth in United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2011).  After Chung, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) was amended to change the language from “the public” to the current “another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information.”  United States v. Liew, 856 F.3d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 2017). 

            To establish the second element, the government must prove that the trade secret owner took “reasonable measures to guard” the secret.  The government is not required to “prove a negative” that the trade secret was never disclosed.  Id. at 601. 

            “[A]n employee’s personal skills, talents or abilities . . . are not trade secrets . . . [F]acts and information acquired during employment can only be trade secrets if they meet the given definition.”  Id. at 594 (cleaned up).  “[I]ndividuals can independently develop technology through proper means and [an employee] is free to leave an employer and use non-trade secret information and skills gained through that employment.”  Id. at 599. 

            The term “owner,” with respect to a trade secret, means the person or entity in whom or in which rightful legal or equitable title to, or license in, the trade secret is reposed.  18 U.S.C. § 1839(4). 

Revised June 2021